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Abstract
This paper presents information on wage-bargaining institutions, collected for 23 European
countries, plus the US and Japan using a standardised questionnaire. Our data provide information
from the years 1995 and 2006, for four sectors of activity and the aggregate economy. The main
findings include a high degree of regulation in wage-setting in most countries. Although union
membership is limited in many of them, union coverage is high and almost all countries also have
some form of national minimum wage. Most countries negotiate wages on several levels, the
sectoral level still being the most dominant, with an increasingly important role for bargaining at the
individual firm level. The average length of collective bargaining agreements is found to lie between
one and three years. Most agreements are strongly driven by developments in prices and eleven of
the countries surveyed have some form of indexation mechanism which affects wages. Cluster
analysis identifies three country groupings of wage-setting institutions.
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1. Introduction
Among the labour market structures influencing macroeconomic performance, wage bargaining
institutions affecting wage outcomes play an important role. There is a vast literature on the role of
collectivisation, centralisation and coordination of wage bargaining in shaping labour market
outcomes, wage levels, wage dispersion and wage flexibility. In a recent survey, Freeman (2007)
presents three ways in which wage-setting institutions affect economic performance: they “alter
incentives”, they “facilitate efficient bargaining”, and they “increase information, communication,
and trust”. Institutional arrangements related to the labour market may also modify the effect of
monetary policy on inflation and unemployment. The well-known Barro and Gordon (1983) model
emphasizes the inability of monetary policy to influence unemployment directly: first, unions set
nominal wages conditionally on rational expectations of the money supply, then the central bank
sets the money supply to minimize inflation and unemployment. The equilibrium of this model is
characterized by monetary policy neutrality and excess inflation. On the other hand, recent
literature shows that non-neutrality can appear when there are strategic interactions between unions
and the central bank. Soskice and Iversen (2000) show that when there is a finite number of wage-
setters and product markets are monopolistic, a non-accommodating monetary policy leads to
important effects on employment. These conclusions are empirically supported by Cukierman and
Lippi (1999), Hall and Franzese (1998) and Aidt and Tzannatos (2005). Using model simulations,
Acocella et al. (2008) find that the effects of monetary policy on the real economy may depend on
the different wage setting strategies.
The relationship between wage bargaining institutions and wage rigidity is also interesting for
monetary policy since nominal rigidities play a crucial role in explaining the impact of monetary
policy on output. Nominal wages may be rigid downwards because of the presence of substantial
resistance to nominal wage cuts, most often attributed to money illusion, fairness considerations,
nominal minimum wages or nominal contracts (Keynes 1936, Slichter and Luedicke 1957, Tobin
1972, Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996). Under low inflation, such rigidity means that more
workers have real wage freezes and fewer experience real wage cuts than would be the case
otherwise. This is of concern to monetary authorities because the lack of real wage cuts may cause
unemployment, while the possibility of a higher inflation target would ease this problem as it
would de facto allow for greater cuts in real terms. In particular, macroeconomic models have
recently shown the importance of real wage rigidity in reproducing nominal rigidities (Christiano et
al. (2005)). Alternatively, if the resistance to wage cuts is informed e.g. as a result of unionisation
or wage indexation, wages may still exhibit downward real rigidity (see Dickens et al. 2007). If
workers resist real (rather than nominal) wage cuts, a higher inflation target will not ease the
problems associated with downward real wage rigidity. In this case wage changes will be highly
concentrated at or above the expected rate of inflation, irrespective of the rate of inflation. In this
paper, we provide some detailed and comparative insight into wage bargaining institutions such as
the duration of agreements and its main determinants, including possible indexation mechanisms2
that naturally affect the speed and the extent to which wages react to economic changes. For
example, the available literature suggests that the average duration of wage agreements limits the
relative flexibility of wages (see Taylor (1983), Cecchetti (1987), Fregert and Jonung (1998) who
use this duration as an indicator of rigidity). Furthermore, Dickens et al. (2007) find a positive
relationship between the degree of union density and union coverage and real wage rigidity.
Although the theoretical literature accords an important role to wage bargaining institutions and a
vast empirical literature tries to quantify this role, the measurement of institutions remains difficult
and comparable information at an international level is still limited. Arguably the most
comprehensive time series of quantitative information on the percentage of union density, the ratio
of minimum to median wage, and indexes of union coverage, coordination and corporatism for a
number of OECD countries is available from the OECD (see for example Elmeskov, Martin and
Scarpetta 1998). However these series provide little information on any other aspects of wage
setting mechanisms and very little qualitative information on how wage setting institutions are
designed or how they function. Furthermore, information for some EU countries is not available.
This makes a good understanding, and particularly the cross-country comparison, of such
institutions difficult.
More detailed quantitative time series and qualitative information on other aspects of wage
bargaining mechanisms (such as union membership, union coverage, bargaining level, the extent of
government involvement in wage setting and the largest unions) is available in Golden, Lange and
Wallerstein (1998) and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000). Kenworthy (2001) provides comparative
information on many indexes of corporatism and Checchi and Lucifora (2002) provide a bivariate
dummy for the existence of wage indexation for some countries up until the late 1990s. However,
these sources generally lack recent information since the mid-1990s or 2000, are not available for
many EU countries and the degree of qualitative information available is varied. Finally,
international organisations such as the European Commission, the European Industrial Relations
Observatory (EIRO) and the OECD (e.g. in their Employment Outlook 2004, 2005) provide more
detailed qualitative information from ad-hoc studies of particular aspects of wage setting
institutions. The sometimes non-standardised nature of the collection or presentation of this
information, the varying and different coverage of countries, periods and institutional features
considered can make the comparison of institutions across countries difficult. Finally, detailed
quantitative and qualitative information on variables such as average agreement length and detailed
information on institutions such as wage indexation mechanisms (arguably extremely important to
understand the link between wage and price developments) is generally not available. Nor do any
of the above sources provide sectoral information on wage-setting institutions by country.
This paper thus adds to the existing literature on wage bargaining institutions and attempts to fill in
some of the gaps in the available quantitative and qualitative information by providing an overview3
of the main characteristics affecting wage formation in 23 European countries
1
, the United States
and Japan for the years 1995 and 20062. The information in this paper is based on a standardised
questionnaire answered by national experts from central banks of each of the countries concerned.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 looks at the questionnaire design and
gives details of the data collection method, outlining the aspects of wage setting mechanisms
considered. Section 3 looks at the collectivisation of wage bargaining in the 24 countries covered,
including the degree of trade union density, collective bargaining coverage and extension
procedures. Section 4 outlines the degree of centralisation across countries. Section 5 describes the
coordination of wage bargaining, also including the role of government in the setting of not only
public, but also private sector wages. Section 6 examines the main determinants of wage
agreements, their average duration and the possible existence, design and coverage of wage
indexation mechanisms. As a conclusion, we summarize our results by doing a cluster analysis and
grouping countries with similar institutions of wage bargaining.
2. Data
The information in this paper was collected using a standardised questionnaire (see Annex 1)
especially designed within the framework of the Eurosystem’s Wage Dynamics Network. This
network was made up of national experts and leading academics in the area of wage setting and the
questionnaires themselves were completed by national experts from the central banks of each of the
countries considered, who were both committed and responsible for giving detailed and accurate
replies. Within this setting, the most common disadvantage of using a questionnaire for data
collection (namely, low or non-response) is overcome. Furthermore, other typical caveats of a
questionnaire based survey, such as subjective assessments which may vary across respondents in
different countries, or the use of different definitions for the one or other indicator which are not
fully comparable across countries are also arguable less problematic within this framework: First,
the respondents are usually experts in the area of wage setting, therefore their knowledge of the
subject matter should be maximised and subjectivity minimised. Second, many respondents,
through their day to day work, participate regularly in the collection of data to be used for cross
country study within e.g. the Eurosystem. They are therefore arguably more aware of the
importance of comparability of data across countries and of those definitions most appropriate and
commonly used for cross-country comparison. Although the total absence of caveats related to the
use of a questionnaire cannot be guaranteed, we find that answers are consistent with and add to
previously available information on wage setting institutions. Annex 2 presents a comparison of
some of the information we collected with OECD data. For some of the countries under study here,
1
These are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
2
Respondents were requested to provide information on wage bargaining institutions for current practices or
the most recent year available (in most cases 2006) and a reference point a decade earlier (in most cases
1995).4
OECD collected comparable information on trade union density (Annex 2 Table 4), union coverage
(Annex 2 Table 5), extension procedures (Annex 2 Table 6), and the level of wage bargaining
(Annex 2 Table 7). For these 4 variables, the answers to our questionnaire and OECD data provide
very similar results, giving us confidence that the data we collected is generally accurate and highly
comparable, across the dimensions of time and country.
This questionnaire was designed to collect comparable information on key wage setting institutions
for two data points (1995 and 2006) and 4 sectors (agriculture, industry, market services and non-
market services (based on the NACE)) as well as the total economy. 23 European countries, Japan
and the US took part in this data collection exercise. An important value added of this data in
relation to pre-existing information is that it allows a comparison of the most recent features of
wage setting institutions with a common reference point in the previous decade. Furthermore, the
questionnaire to our knowledge collects some uniquely comparable information on sectoral wage
setting and wage bargaining institutions, starting from some more procedural aspects of union
density, coverage and coordination and continuing with further issues that can be related to relative
flexibility/rigidity of wages across countries, such as average agreement length and the elements
considered during wage negotiations. In addition, this paper also considers the role of government
in the determination of not only public, but also private sector wages and the importance of
minimum wages and wage indexation in particular. In order of the questionnaire, data was
collected on: details of trade union density; collective bargaining; the level of wage bargaining; the
coordination of wage bargaining; the determinants of collective wage negotiations; collective
bargaining agreement length; minimum wages and indexation mechanisms. Respondents were
asked to state a reply, or alternatively indicate that data were not relevant, or alternatively not
known. The data presented in this paper is based on the pure data collected. That is, it does not mix
information from other sources. Comparison of some of the rudimentary information available
from other sources indeed shows a high degree of the comparability of replies. For example,
comparison with information available from the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) e.g
Fajertag (2000) and European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) on the country-specific
systems in the mid to late 1990s including average contract length and level of minimum wages is
in line with that collected in this dataset.
Although much effort was assigned to collecting detailed information on the most important
characteristics of wage setting institutions in a comparable way, it should also be noted that the
details of national wage setting institutions are inherently complicated. Individual countries may
have exceptions, nuances and additional elements to any of their wage setting institutions, which
underlay the key characterisation of their national system. One paper cannot hope to do justice to
this complexity while also presenting all of national details in a short and accessible manner. Here,
we therefore focus on the key characteristics of each national system.5
3. Collectivisation of wage bargaining
The first characteristic of wage setting that we consider is collectivisation. Many studies have
related the collectivisation of wage setting to average wage levels and to the responsiveness of
wages to labour market conditions. Collectivisation is generally measured by the proportion of
workers in a workplace that are trade union members (trade union density) and by the proportion
that are covered by a collective wage agreement (collective bargaining coverage). The above-
mentioned international data sources generally cover this aspect of wage setting for the national
level rather well. We provide here information from questions 1 and 2 of the questionnaire, for our
set of 24 countries, for 1995 and 2006.
The degree of trade union density, defined as the percentage of workers who are members of a
trade union, varied strongly across developed countries in 2006 (Question 1, see Figure 1 and
Annex 3 Table 8). It is relatively high in countries like Denmark, Finland and Sweden (between 70
and 80%). Trade union densities in Belgium, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Norway are a little lower in
a close range between 50% and 60%. In contrast, the lowest rates of trade union density are
observed in most of the Eastern European countries, France, Spain, and the United States (close to
10%-15% or less). Trade union density decreased around the industrialised world between 1995
and 2006. It decreased particularly strongly in Eastern Europe and the former Eastern Germany. In
contrast, countries where the trade union density was already rather low did not experience any
further strong decrease in trade union density during the last decade (see Annex 3 Table 8).
Figure 1: Countries with very low to high trade union density
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The rate of trade union density also differs significantly across sectors. In most countries, union
density is the highest in non-market services. In this sector, rates of membership below 25% are
rare (see Figure 2 and Annex 3 Table 8) and rates have generally been stable over the last decade in
most countries, even slightly increasing in the UK and US. Union density is lower but traditionally
still important in the industrial sector. In the majority of countries, rates of trade union density in
this sector range between 25 and 50%, but have been declining since 1995. Density rates are very
low in market services and agriculture. In market services, the lowest rate is observed in France and
in the United-States (around 5%) where density rates are half as high as those in industry and even
three times lower than in non-market services. Union density rates in the market services sector
have also declined over the last decade.
Figure 2: Trade Union Density by Sectors (% of total countries with very low, low, medium
and high levels of trade union density, total economy and by sector across time)
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Although trade union density has been declining over the past decade in Europe, a large proportion
of workers are still covered by some kind of collective wage agreement. In fact collective
bargaining coverage is still generally high in Europe (Question 2, see Table 1 below). In Austria,
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the Nordic countries, Portugal and Slovenia the
coverage rate is between 80 and 100% and stable (or even slightly increasing in some countries)
over the last decade. On the other hand, bargaining coverage is low in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, the UK (between 30 and 40%), and especially low in Japan, Lithuania and the
United States (lower than 20%), even decreasing in the case of the latter since the mid-nineties.
Coverage rates also vary across sectors, but for those countries where national collective bargaining
coverage rates are high, coverage rates are also consistently high across sectors. In both Germany7
and Spain, the decrease in coverage rates stems mainly from the industry sector. In countries with
low or very low bargaining coverage, coverage is also very low in market services, higher but still
low in the industry sector and a little higher in the non-market services.
Table 1: Trade union coverage by country, across sectors and time
2006/Most recent 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995
Austria H H H H H H H H H H Ç
Belgium H H H H H H H H H H
Cyprus M M Ç
Czech Republic L M L M M L Ç
Denmark M L Ç H M Ç M M Ç H H H H Ç
Estonia L
Finland H H H H H H H H H H
France H H Ç H H Ç H H H H Ç
Germany (West) M H È M H È L L H H M M È
Germany (East) L L L L L L H H L M È
Greece H H H H H H H H Æ
Hungary VL VL Ç L L È L L È L L È L L È
Ireland
Italy H H H H H H H H H H
Japan VL L È VL VL È VL VL Ç VL VL
Lithuania VL VL VL VL VL VL L L VL VL
Luxembourg VL H H H M
The Netherlands H H H H H
Norway L L M M M M H H M M
Poland L M Ç
Portugal H H H H H H H H H H
Slovenia H H H H H H H H H H
Spain H M Ç H H È H M Ç IR IR H H È
Sweden H H H H H H H H H H
The Untited Kingdom VL L VL M L L È
The United States VL VL VL VL È VL VL È VL VL È VL VL È
In sum - number of countries
Very low 4 4 3 2 4 3 2 2 3 3
Low 3 3 3 3 4 3 2 2 5 3
Moderate 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 0 4 6
High 9 9 12 12 10 10 13 14 12 12
Total 18 17 21 19 20 19 19 18 24 24
Note: 2006 refers to 2004 in Germany, 2005 in Spain, 2004 in France, 2000 in Denmark, 2003 in Estonia, 2004 in Hungary, 2001 in Poland
Note: 1995 refers to 1997 in France, 1994 in Denmark, 1998 in Hungary and 2000 in Luxembourg
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
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Note: Arrows refer to position in 2006 relative to 1995, if quantitaive value is provided and difference is at least 1pp. A sign is also filled in if there is a change in
Total
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Note: 0%<VL=Very Low<25%, 26%<L=Low<50%, 51%<M=Moderate<75%, 76%<H=High<100%
An important feature for Continental Europe countries is the difference between very low rates of
trade union density and high rates of collective bargaining coverage. Two factors explain this
discrepancy between union density and union coverage. First, contrary to the US, in most European
countries, employers voluntarily apply to non-union members the terms of an agreement. Thus,
workers can be covered by a wage agreement without being members of a trade union, which has
generally reduced trade union membership. The second explanation is the existence and the
widespread use of extension procedures for (sector-level) wage agreements (see Annex 3 Table 9).
These procedures (which are generally administrative or legal) make a collective agreement
binding for all employees and employers within its usual field of application, even if some
employers or trade unions did not directly sign the agreement. This means that in those countries
where trade union bargaining generally occurs at a sectoral level, extension procedures may extend
the coverage of the outcome of this bargaining to cover additional sectors, firms and therefore also
individuals who are not members of the negotiating unions. By definition, these procedures directly
or indirectly extend the effects of bargaining agreements by increasing the “collectivisation” of
wage bargaining. In some countries, such an extension is automatic (see Annex 3 Table 10), such8
as in Spain (by law), Italy (by the constitution)3 or Austria (due to mandatory membership of
employers in the Austrian Economic Chambers). However, for the majority of countries, public
institutions play a crucial role, with specific public commissions taking charge of extensions (e.g.
in France, Finland, Germany, Hungary or Luxembourg). Extensions can also be requested by
unions, employers or the Ministry of Labour, being granted by a public decision (such as a decree
or a specific decision from the Ministry of Labour). Other requirements may also need to be met
before an extension is possible. For example, in Finland, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands and
Spain, at least 50% of employees must already be covered by a wage negotiation for an extension
to be possible.
The absence of extension procedures is rare in Europe. Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia
and Spain all have extension procedures. In the Czech Republic and in Germany, such procedures
are limited to specific sectors and in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia extension
procedures have been adopted only very recently. The lack of extension procedures in Denmark,
Norway and Sweden is explained by the already very high level of trade union membership. In
Cyprus, Lithuania and the UK, extension procedures did not exist in 2006 and the rate of collective
bargaining coverage is almost equal to that of trade union density, thus collective agreements only
apply for union members. This is very similar to the American case.
Coverage also appears to vary to some extent by firm size (at the firm level) and worker type (for
example at the industry or sectoral level). Differences across firms of different size are apparent in
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the UK
and the US. In principle, coverage increases with firm size. For example, in the case of Western
Germany, coverage increases from 30%, to 60%, to 80% for respective firm sizes of 1-9, 50-199
and over 500 employees respectively. Some countries like Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany,
Hungary, Japan, and Slovenia mention the existence of higher coverage rates for some types of
workers. These include better-educated/higher-skilled employees, full-time employees and in the
case of industry, manual workers.
4. Centralisation of wage bargaining
The economic literature predicts different impacts of the centralization of wage bargaining on
economic performance. Bruno and Sachs (1985) support the view that there is a linear relationship
between the centralization of wage bargaining and economic outcomes and the best economic
outcomes are obtained when wages are set at a centralized level. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) in a
well-known paper challenge this theory and suggest a hump-shaped relationship between the
degree of centralization of wage bargaining and economic performance with both centralized and
3
Only “representative” agreements are extended - i.e. in case of disputation, judges can grant pay raises to
workers based on these agreements (though no law defines what makes a collective contract
“representative”).9
decentralized levels of wage bargaining helping to reduce unemployment and inflation. They argue
that in centralised environments “large and all-encompassing trade unions naturally recognise their
market power and take into account both inflationary and unemployment effects of wage increases.
Conversely, unions operating at the individual firm or plant level have limited market power. In
intermediate cases, unions can exert some market power but are led to ignore the macroeconomic
implications of their actions” (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988, p.13). A vast empirical literature (see
Aidt and Tzannatos (2005) or Flanagan (1999) for surveys) concludes that it is difficult to find a
robust relationship between the centralization of wage bargaining and economic outcomes.
A second interesting issue is the relationship between wage dispersion and the level of wage
bargaining. Wages that are not sufficiently differentiated, for example, by skill or region may
contribute to increase the mismatch between labour supply and labour demand, thus increasing the
unemployment rates of some skill groups and in some regions. If relative wage compression is too
strong, in particular low-skilled workers or workers living in low productivity regions may remain
unemployed. Similarly minimum wages which are too high may price young and lower skilled
workers out of the labour market. Highly centralized wage bargaining can be expected to lead to
less wage dispersion than under decentralized wage bargaining and empirical results obtained with
m i c ro  d at a s e e m  to  c o n fi rm  t h e se  e x pe c t at i o n s  ( se e  C a rd  an d  d e  l a R i c a ( 2 0 0 6 ) ,  C a rd o so  an d
Portugal (2005), Hartog et al. (2002)).
Question 3 collects information on the level of wage bargaining. In most countries wages are
negotiated at multiple levels. Two related questions therefore emerge: at which level does
bargaining take place and what is the relationship between the different levels of wage bargaining
in the whole process through which final outcomes are reached? Our data distinguishes between 6
levels of bargaining: national, regional, intersectoral, sectoral, occupational and company level.
T h r e e  l e v e l s  o f  b a r g a i n i n g  a p p e a r  t o  b e  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  t h e  r e s t  -  t h e  r e g i o n a l  l e v e l ,  t h e
intersectoral level, and to a lesser extent the occupational level (see Figure 3). The regional level is
only relevant for wage bargaining in Austria, France, Germany and Spain. Intersectoral agreements
are observed only in Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden. Agreements at the
occupational level are observed in a slightly larger group of countries. Consequently, wage
bargaining is the most common in Europe, the US and Japan at three levels, namely the national,
sectoral and company level. According to the answers to our wage questionnaire, in Europe, the
sectoral level is the most frequently occurring and also tends to be dominant. The company level is
also very usual but generally not dominant.4
Cross country heterogeneity in the levels at which wage bargaining takes place is strong and three
groups of countries can be identified: First, in Finland, Ireland and Slovenia, the national level of
wage bargaining is dominant. In these countries, negotiations between trade unions and employer
4 The dominant level does not necessarily need to be only one. For more details on this topic see part 4.10
federations at the national level lead to general recommendations for negotiations at lower levels.
These negotiations are the first step before more decentralized and less dominant negotiations take
place at the sectoral level in Finland and Slovenia or at the firm level in Ireland.
Second, in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden the sectoral level is the dominant one for wage
bargaining, which does not exclude that national guidelines could still play a role in these
countries. In Germany and Spain, sectoral level bargaining is coupled with regional level
negotiations. For most of the other countries in this group, company-level agreements are common,
but cover a limited share of employees (10% in Spain and 22% in France), with the exception of
Denmark where company agreements are dominant in the industry sector. Generally speaking,
company level agreements cannot be less favourable than sectoral agreements. Even if firms can
legally avoid sectoral level clauses (as in Austria, France since 2005, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Spain) these “escape clauses” were scarcely used in 2006. On
the other hand, escape clauses have been commonly used in Germany in the most recent years,
allowing for more flexibility at the company level as individual firms have been able to control and
cut down on wage costs by limiting for example bonus and holiday payments.
Third, in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the UK and US,
the company level is the dominant level of wage bargaining and wage bargaining systems are
highly decentralized. Sectoral or national levels of wage agreements existed in some Eastern
European countries in the mid 1990s, but by 2006 no longer played a role.
Significant heterogeneity in the wage bargaining level across sectors is not apparent. One can only
note that non-market services wages are often set at the national level through negotiation with the
government. For example, even when company-level agreements dominate in the market sector in
countries like Lithuania and the UK, government or at least public health employees’ wages are
determined at a national level. With the exception of the changes in Eastern Europe mentioned
above, no variation in the dominant level of wage bargaining over time is apparent. Although it is
generally stated that bargaining has become more decentralised in many countries with more
negotiation taking place at the company level, this is mainly through additional adjustments at the
company level or via the use of opt-out clauses in higher level agreements. All in all, the sectoral
level seems to have maintained the dominant role in most countries. Furthermore, for those
countries with dominant sectoral bargaining, trade-union coverage is also generally higher.11
Figure 3: The levels at which wage bargaining both occurs and is most dominant, by country over
time
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5. Wage bargaining coordination and government involvement
The coordination of wage formation relates to the extent to which wage negotiations are
coordinated across the various wage bargaining levels/actors within an economy and thus the
extent to which the external consequences of wage agreements on the whole economy are taken
into account. Horizontal coordination requires the synchronisation of players within the same level
of bargaining (e.g. in the case of sectoral wage bargaining, the synchronisation of different unions
within the same sector) and vertical coordination refers to the synchronisation across the different
levels of bargaining explained in the previous section, so as to achieve consensus on a joint
macroeconomic strategy. The coordination and centralization of wage bargaining are different
concepts and the relation between the two is not obvious. For example, coordination is still possible
in an environment of decentralised wage bargaining if coordination institutions are present.
Alternatively, coordination can be difficult to achieve at a centralized level if there are divisions
among unions.
It is not clear whether coordination is beneficial. Theoretical literature on the coordination of wage
bargaining argues that a wage bargaining system with coordinated sectoral wage bargaining can
lead to the same economic outcome as with centralized bargaining (Soskice, 1990, Teulings and
Hartog, 1998). Moreover, strategic interactions between trade unions and monetary policy have
been extensively studied by the theoretical literature. The general conclusions are mixed, but12
suggest that semi-coordinated bargaining can lead to higher levels of employment, challenging the
Calmfors and Driffill hump-shaped relationship.
Our data distinguish between five possible forms of coordination, these are: state-imposed
indexation, state-imposed minimum wage and other government involvement, inter-associational
coordination, intra-associational coordination, and pattern bargaining. Most countries operate under
at least one form of coordination, with intra-associational coordination seeming to be dominant for
the majority in countries, in line with most negotiations taking place at the sectoral level. However,
in Hungary, Poland, the UK and the US, wage bargaining is characterized by highly decentralized
wage negotiations and no coordination (even the minimum wage plays a limited role in the
coordination of wages). In Ireland, when again no specific type of coordination is apparent,
national collective agreements are reached through a process of first negotiations between unions
and employers and then further negotiations at an inter-associational level. Furthermore, these
characteristics of wage setting have remained very stable, with little apparent variation across time
and almost none by sector. Results are gathered in Figure 4 and a more detailed description of the
various forms of coordination in the Europe, Japan and the US follows.
Figure 4: Types of wage bargaining coordination that apply and are most dominant, by
country over time
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5.1 Direct government involvement in wage setting
a. State imposed wage indexation
Answers to question 4 show that in three countries (Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg), state-
imposed indexation is a dominant form of coordination in the economy as a whole (see Figure 4).13
These countries have a formal and automatic indexation of nominal wages to an official price index
which goes beyond indexation clauses for some workers that need to be negotiated in each wage
contract (this type of wage indexation is discussed further in section 6). In Luxembourg, wages are
adjusted upwards, as soon as the 6-month moving average of the national CPI is 2.5% higher than
its level when the last wage indexation occurred. In Belgium, there are several systems, with fixed
time intervals or fixed magnitudes of 2 %, but  the reference index is always the “Health Index”
(national CPI excluding motor fuels, alcohol and tobacco). In Cyprus, indexation is less formal, it
is not legally binding but is part of the consensus between the government and social partners.
Almost all collective agreements in Cyprus contain Cost-of-Living-Allowance (COLA) clauses
(linked directly to the CPI change) and the government publish twice a year the COLA index used
in the wage bargaining process leading to a de facto automatic wage indexation. In some cases this
has resulted into the need for additional measures to moderate wage inflation. Furthermore, in the
case of Belgium, wage indexation is nowadays combined with national intersectoral coordination.
Looking into the sectoral information on this question, two more countries appear to have state-
imposed wage indexation, albeit only in the public sector, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. In the
case of Slovenia, state imposed indexation existed for the whole of the economy in 1995, but this
was no longer the case for the private sector by 2006. Finally, the Polish public sector was also
affected by state-imposed wage indexation in 1995, but this was abolished by 2006. More
information on less formal types of wage indexation and the way that price developments are taken
into account in wage negotiation rounds can be found in the following section.
b. State-imposed minimum wages
Minimum wages are set through national legislation, collective agreements, or sometimes through a
mixture of the two and are in all cases legally binding. Questions 4 and 8 of the questionnaire (see
Table 2 below) show that some form of a national minimum wage was found in all countries under
review in 2006, with the exception of only Italy, which had no state or other form of minimum
wage in any sector of the economy5, and Germany, where bargained minimum wages were only
present in a few branches of the industrial sector. In Nordic countries like Finland, Sweden and
No rw ay  but al so  i n A ustri a, m inim um  w age s are  nego ti ated  in e ach  se cto r an d  are  part o f the
collective agreements. Seventeen countries had a state imposed minimum wage in 2006. National
minimum wages were introduced in Ireland and the UK during the ten year period considered.
State-imposed minimum wages are minimum wages which are enforced by government. Whereas
under a system of negotiated minimum wages, workers not covered by a minimum wage agreement
can be paid at rates below that minimum wage, this is not the case for workers under a national
minimum wage, where a statutory or national minimum wage constitutes the legal wage floor for
5In Italy, there is no national minimum wage. However, judges grant pay raises to workers based on sectoral
extended agreements which may substitute for the legal minimum wage.14
all workers. Question 4 shows that in the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, Portugal and
Slovenia, a state imposed national minimum wage is the dominant form of wage coordination and
is set by tripartite negotiations (including employer representatives, employee representatives and
government, such as in Belgium) or decided unilaterally by the Government (as in France and
Slovenia). Furthermore, the rate of increase in the minimum wage is often used as a reference for
sectoral or even firm level wage bargaining in France, Greece, Ireland and Spain.
Table 2: The existence of minimum wages, by country, sector and over time
Country 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Belgium Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cyprus Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Czech Republic Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Denmark N N Y* Y N N Y* Y
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
France Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Germany N N Y N N N N N N N
Greece Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Hungary Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ireland Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Italy N N N N N N N N N N
Japan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lithuania Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Luxembourg Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
The Netherlands Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slovenia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sweden Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y* Y*
The Untited Kingdom Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
The United States Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
In sum - number of countries
Yes 17 15 18 16 17 15 17 15 17 16
Yes* 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 5
No 3 5 1 4 2 4 3 5 2 4
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv
Notes: Y: Exists, N: Does not exist, a * denotes the existence of minimum wages set by collective
agreements as opposed to national legislation/statutory minimum wages.
For most countries where a statutory minimum wage exists, the actual proportion of workers
working at that wage is systematically less than 25% (see Annex 3 Table 11). Three groups of
countries can be distinguished. In Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and the
US, less than 5% of employees were paid at the minimum wage in 2006. In Estonia, Hungary,
Portugal or Lithuania, the figure was between 5 and 10% and in Cyprus, France, and Luxembourg
between 10 and 20%. This coverage varies with sector, the proportion of employees paid at the
minimum wage being higher in market services and lower in non-market services than in other
sectors. There is also evidence that the proportion of employees paid at the minimum wage has
increased in some countries such as Cyprus, France and Hungary over the last decade.
The level of minimum wages (statutory or bargained) varies significantly by country at above
1,000 euros per month in Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and in
the UK in 2006, and less than 500 euros in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Portugal,
and Lithuania. The position of the minimum wage on the wage distribution also differs across
countries. In Spain, the minimum wage is equal to less than 30% of the average wage of all15
employees in 2006. In contrast, it is above 50% in Finland, France and the Netherlands. For those
countries with a comparatively low level of minimum relative to the average wage, the tendency
has been for this ratio to increase over the last decade (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: The ratio of minimum to average wage, by country across time (percent)
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In some countries such as Austria, Germany, Japan, Spain and Sweden the level of minimum
wages is also sector specific. There are variations between the minimum wages of blue-collar
workers and white-collar workers in Denmark, between manual and non-manual workers in Austria
and Greece and by occupation in Spain and Sweden. A number of countries set a lower level of
minimum wages for the young, less educated while the minimum wage also varies by tenure
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden and the US). Variation by hours of work (Slovenia) and region (Japan) are also apparent.
However, most countries do not consider their minimum wages to interact with other systems of
protecting pay at the lower end of the labour market (such as training schemes and wage subsidies),
with the exception of Greece, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Portugal. In these countries,
unemployment benefits, social benefits, vocational subsidies and wage subsidies can depend upon
the level of minimum wages.
In terms of how fast they rise, minimum wages are indexed or adjusted for past inflation or some
other inflation measure in most countries, including Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia
(inflation forecast), France (indexed), Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and the
US (most commonly with reference to the CPI and with indexation in some US states). In some
countries fairness arguments related to convergence to average pay (Austria, Belgium, France,
Italy, Lithuania) or at least increases similar to the economy average (Cyprus, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) or European Union average
(Greece) are also taken into account. Minimum wages are adjusted according to explicit formulas
in France, Poland and to a lesser extent Estonia. However, in all countries apart from Germany16
(where the minimum wage is binding for a limited number of sectors), minimum wage increases
are also legally binding at the national level and in Austria, France, Greece, Ireland and Poland,
they also constitute a floor or a determining factor for other wage increases.
c. Other government involvement
In Europe and in the US, the government is heavily involved in the setting of public sector wages.
Answers to question 5 of our questionnaire show this to be the case for most countries with the
exception of Japan and Sweden, with specific commissions sometimes in charge of the bargaining
process and after negotiations with the unions (see Figure 6). The final decision is however largely
in the hands of the government and ultimately dependent and consistent with the annual
government budget that needs to be approved by the Parliament. In the cases of federal systems,
like Germany and the US, the government is involved in the setting of wages at the federal level
and for federal employees, but further negotiations take place at the level of the Länder or the
individual States for local public employees.
In some countries, the government also provides specific mediation services for the private sector
as an intermediary mostly in cases of disputes, such as in France (“Commission mixte paritaire” at
the sectoral level - 88 cases in 2005), the US (National Mediation Board), Cyprus, Finland, Poland,
the UK (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service - 1353 cases in 2002/2003 at the firm
level). In Belgium, government can set the wage norm that gives the expected wage increase in
three neighbouring countries as an indication of maximum wage increases in the own country and
in order to preserve competitiveness, in case social partners fail to agree on this themselves.
Turning to government involvement in tripartite agreements, these are usually geared at more
social policy related issues like unemployment compensation, social security contributions and
minimum wages (e.g. Estonia, Lithuania and Portugal). For example, the government intervenes in
wage negotiations on a regular basis in Finland when a tripartite Incomes Policy Commission
gathers each year to decide wage increase guidelines, in principle in line with inflation and
productivity developments. In most countries, tripartite meetings are also held to discuss labour
conditions, or promote social dialogue, with parties gathering on a regular basis (e.g. in Estonia and
Hungary) or more irregularly (Cyprus in 2004, France in 2005 and Italy in 1993). Government
involvement has remained very stable over last decade (see Figure 6).17
Figure 6: Form and extent of government involvement in wage setting, by country over time.
(the government acts as an intermediary, in tripartite agreements and in public wage setting)
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5.2 Inter and intra-associational coordination and pattern bargaining
Based on the replies to question 4 of our questionnaire, it appears that inter-associational
agreements have gained importance over the last decade and that they are often the dominant
mechanism of wage coordination, as in Belgium, Greece and Spain. In Belgium, negotiations take
place every two years, when a wage norm is also agreed. In Spain, there has been a national
agreement between major unions and employer representatives since 2002 that establishes the main
lines of wage negotiation each year. In Finland, Ireland and Slovenia, general guidelines are set by
a tripartite conference between the government, unions and employers federations. In Norway,
negotiations take place at a confederal level in odd years and in other years, intersectoral elements
are taken into account during negotiations.
Intra-associational coordination or coordination within peak associations occurs when unions
and/or employers' organisations take the lead in coordination and commit to undertake joint
decisions. This is naturally the case when peak associations encompass most bargaining units. Intra
associational coordination is dominant in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.
Pattern bargaining occurs when wage negotiations start in one (often sector-level) bargaining unit
(the leader) and are then repeated by other bargainers (followers) who orientate their wage
negotiations towards the leading sector's settlements (Question 4). Sometimes the agreements in the
leading sector have such a strong influence that wage formation becomes de facto coordinated. In
A u s t r i a ,  G e r m a n y ,  N o r w a y  a n d  S w e d e n ,  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  i s  o f t e n  t h e  f i r s t  t o  c o n c l u d e18
agreements and is then followed by other sectors. The exchange of information within and between
sectors is easier when this takes place within a smaller country like Austria for example. In the
latter case, economic forecasts by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research, which is de facto
owned by the social partners, also play a major role as they are regarded by all negotiators as
authoritative.
6. Length and other elements/determinants entering collective wage agreements
As outlined in the introduction, a particularly relevant question from the view of the monetary
policy-maker is how collective bargaining agreements affect the rigidity/flexibility of wages. For
example, the average duration of wage agreements and the main determinants of collective
agreements can be expected to limit the relative flexibility of wages.
Question 7 of the questionnaire collects information on the average length of collective bargaining
agreements. Figure 7 shows that, according to most recent data, the average length of collective
agreements varies between one and three years in Europe and stands at one year in Japan (see also
Annex 3 Table 12). European countries with the longest average agreement length of three years
are Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. In contrast, average agreement lengths of one and one and a half
year’s duration are found in Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Hungary, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Poland and the United Kingdom. In Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg Norway, Slovenia and Spain, agreements frequently last two years or two years and a
half. In Europe as a whole, very little change in the average agreement length is apparent over the
last decade. However in Denmark, Finland and Germany, the replies to the questionnaire suggest
that the average agreement length has increased, possibly implying less flexibility, but also the
possibility of longer higher-level agreements that allow however more flexibility at lower (e.g.
company) levels. In terms of differences across different economic sectors, some countries quote
longer agreements in services, such as Estonia, Hungary and Spain. In some cases public sector
wage agreements have a shorter duration compared to the market sectors, of about a year, possibly
reflecting the link of public sector wage-setting to annual budgets.19
Figure 7: Average Collective Agreement Length by country, over time (in years)
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In most countries, a “seasonality” of wage negotiations is observed. In Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal and the UK, wage negotiations begin at
the end of one year or the first months of the next and agreements are concluded, mostly within the
first quarter. This regular pattern is slightly modified in France where a peak is also observed in
July (due to minimum wage adjustments), in Japan where nation-wide wage negotiations (called
Shunto) take place in April, in Norway where the peak is observed between March and June and in
Slovenia where wage negotiations mostly take place in August. For the other countries (the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and the US) no
particular month of the year when wage negotiations take place is defined, but many negotiations
start one to two months prior to the end of a particular agreement. Some variation in the timing is
apparent by sector, notably in Luxembourg, Norway (where industry usually negotiates first) and
Portugal and public sector pay is specified in April while public sector pay is specified in April in
the UK and is usually set within the first two months of the year in Greece
Delays in renegotiations are more common than pre-expiry renegotiation and in several countries
(see Annex 3 Tables 13 and 14). Pre-expiry negotiations are frequent in the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and the US and can be related
at times to cyclical downturns and concerns about competitiveness (Luxembourg) or financial
problems at the company level (Netherlands). Delays are observed frequently in Austria, Estonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and in the US. These delays
are usually due to the inability of parties involved in negotiations to reach an agreement and are
commonly followed by retroactive application and one-off payments, e.g. in France, Germany,
Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. Differences in terms of renegotiations and delays across sectors and20
different types of workers (e.g. manual/non-manual, skilled/unskilled, part-time/full-time,
permanent/temporary workers) are generally not apparent. Delays have become more common over
the last decade in Germany.
Turning now to the elements entering collective wage negotiations, respondents were asked in
question 6 to consider some broad categories of factors and provide details on the way that these
are taken into account. These broad categories were namely: prices, labour productivity,
competitiveness and changes in taxation or social contributions.
As one might expect, prices were found to be the most important determinant of negotiations. In
almost all countries, the reference price index is the CPI, in some cases with its forecast entering
negotiated wage increases (Slovenia and Sweden). More specifically on the role of prices in the
determination of wage increases, further information was requested in question 9, where
respondents were asked to address the issue of wage indexation, i.e. the case where price dynamics
are indexed either automatically or through wage guidelines and incorporated into wage increases,
rather than just being part of the elements discussed during wage negotiations. The extent to which
wages are adjusted to price increases - in a formal or informal way - has an important impact on
labour market and macroeconomic outcomes and is typically a crucial parameter in many
macroeconomic models. Institutional data sources are almost always limited to binary information,
i.e. whether or not a country has formal indexation by law or not. However, indexation can also be
less formal, e.g. when there is no regulation covering the whole economy but still the incorporation
of price increases in some segments of the labour market is widely accepted. In addition, it is also
possible that some types of wages are automatically indexed according to law - often minimum
wages - while others are not. The information received via the questionnaire on which this paper is
based is innovative on this issue, through trying to assess the overall degree to which workers are
actually affected by some kind of formal or informal wage indexation.
We find that 11 countries have some form of wage indexation to prices (Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain and the US) (see Table 3
below). Some differences exist between countries in terms of the reference that is used, with most
countries linking wage increases to past price increases usually using some sort of a moving
average (Belgium, Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Spain and the US). In some cases however, wage
increases actually embed expected inflation (Estonia, Slovenia) or a combination of an adjustment
for past unforeseen increases and expected inflation ahead (Finland, Italy and Ireland).
Furthermore, in some countries, wage indexation is fully automatic, with wages being adjusted as
soon as inflation exceeds a reference rate (Cyprus, Luxembourg and partly Belgium), while in
others, wages are adjusted retrospectively (Spain).21
Table 3: Percentage of workers covered by wage indexation clauses, by country and sectors,
across time
Country 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Belgium H H H H H H H H H H
Cyprus M M
Czech Republic None None None None None None None None None None
Denmark None None None None None None None None None None
Estonia None None None None None None None None None None
Finland H VL H VL H VL H VL H VL
France VL VL VL VL VL VL
Germany None None None None None None None None None None
Greece None M None M None M None L None M
Hungary None None None None None None None None None None
Ireland None None None None None None None None None None
Italy VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Japan None None None None None None None None None None
Lithuania
Luxembourg H H H H H H H H H H
The Netherlands None None None None None None None None None None
Norway None None None None None None None None None None
Poland VL VL VL VL VL
Portugal None None None None None None None None None None
Slovenia VL H VL H VL H H H L H
Spain None None H M
Sweden None None None None None None None None None None
The Untited Kingdom None
The United States VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
In sum - number of countries
Very low 5 4 6 5 6 5 4 4 5 5
Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Moderate 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
High 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3
Total 8 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 11 11
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
VL = Very Low <0-25%>; L = Low <26-50%>; M = Moderate <51-75%>; H = High <76-100%>
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agriculture Industry Market Services Non Market Services
We distinguish between countries with no formal indexation, countries with full automatic
indexation, countries where only the minimum wage is indexed, and finally countries where
indexation is implemented through collective wage agreements. When indexation is fully
automatic, like in Belgium6, Cyprus (where the system is mixed see above) and Luxembourg , it
affects nearly 100% of the workforce, but less when it works through collective agreements (like in
Finland and Spain), as the resulting coverage also depends on the general collective agreement
coverage. When the indexation is obtained through minimum wages, this coverage is as expected
much lower (e.g. France and Slovenia). Finally, for some countries like Austria, Estonia, Hungary,
Italy, Poland and the US, there does not appear to be any particular form of wage indexation to
prices, nonetheless a low proportion of wage earners is affected, namely via some but limited
amount of wage contracts.
No significant differences appear across sectors in terms of the extent to which wages are affected
by indexation and no big changes have been introduced in the last decade. However, in Italy the
reference value used is now the consensus expected inflation rather than the government target, in
Greece past catch-up clauses for higher than realised inflation have been abolished and in Slovenia
wages are now linked to expected rather than past inflation.
6 Note however that the reference price is the so called "Health Index", which excludes prices of motor fuels, alcohol and
tobacco from the NICP, thus mitigating the second-round effects of oil price shocks on wages. Moreover, the indicative
wage norm is set in nominal terms and an increasing number of collective agreements feature an all-in clause that avoids
indexation to unexpectedly high inflation.22
Labour productivity (at the firm, sector or economy-wide level) is the second most cited factor
entering wage negotiations (Question 6). The link between wage growth and labour productivity is
of course a natural one, however it is interesting to see whether different measures of productivity
are taken into account across countries and sectors. It turns out that countries can broadly be
divided into two groups in terms of measures of productivity considered, namely countries that
consider productivity in the economy as a whole (Cyprus, France, Germany) and countries where
sectoral developments are taken into account (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands in some
industrial sectors and Estonia in industry and the market services). In Japan and Norway, it is
productivity both at the firm and the sectoral level that affect wage negotiations. In most cases, the
level at which productivity developments are taken into account is consistent with the respective
level on which collective agreements are signed. However, in the public sector, labour productivity
appears to play less of a role and if any, only at the economy-wide level. Finally, no changes
appear to have taken place in the last decade in terms of the way or the degree to which
productivity developments are taken into account in wage negotiations.
Turning to further elements in the determination of collective wage agreements, it appears that
c o m pe ti t i v e n e s s i s s ue s  al s o  pl ay  a  ro l e  i n  m o s t  co un t ri e s  ( Q ue s ti o n  6 ) .  In  t h e  c as e  o f  sm al l e r
countries such as Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway,
the average pay increases of the neighbourhood countries (competitors and trading partner) are
taken into consideration. Similarly in the UK, firm profitability plays a vital role in wage
negotiations.
A further important element in wage negotiations is possible changes in taxation and social
contributions. Apparently, such changes are used rather commonly as arguments for wage changes,
while in some cases like Slovenia significant tax changes may even result in renegotiations of
contracts. Finally, fairness issues and the convergence of wages in a sector also play a role in
determining wage agreements in France, Germany, Greece, Japan, Luxembourg and Lithuania.
7. Concluding cluster analysis
As a conclusion, we summarize our main findings by grouping together countries that seem to have
similar wage bargaining characteristics. We then draw a general picture of the resulting broad types
of bargaining systems that exist across countries, while also explaining the main remaining
differences among countries within these types.
For this purpose, we run a hierarchical cluster analysis using most of the information obtained
using the questionnaire. We focus on data for the year 2006 (omitting information on East
Germany) for the following variables: trade union density, extension procedures, coverage of
collective agreements, existing and most dominant and levels of wage bargaining, existence of
opening clauses, type of coordination, government involvement in wage setting, average agreement
length, existence of a minimum wage and type of indexation and proportion of workers covered by23
wage indexation arrangements. The variables used in this analysis are more precisely described in
Annex 4 and are either actual answers to the questionnaire or recoded values for the relevant
variables based on these answers. All variables are ordinal (in line with most of the answers to the
questionnaire) and thus using the same type of variables makes the distance computation more
consistent. The analysis has been undertaken using SAS procedures. We use the method of
Euclidian distance and run the algorithm of the most distant neighbour to clearly separate the
different groups. The results of this analysis are illustrated in the dendrogram in Figure 8 below.
Three groups of countries can be identified through the cluster analysis of wage setting institutions:
1. The first group mainly consists of countries with a broadly regulated system of wage
bargaining, which is quite typical of Western European countries. This group can be characterised
by the existence of extension procedures and a high level of collective agreement coverage, a
dominance of sectoral (and to a lesser extent firm-level) wage bargaining and the general absence
of coordination except through minimum wages (or trend setting sectors). This group can then be
further divided into four subgroups:
a. The first subgroup consists of Austria, France, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal.
These countries present the core group of countries with a dominance of sector-level
wage bargaining, the existence of statutory minimum wages and extension procedures.
b. In the second subgroup, we find Germany and Italy; they differ from other countries in
this group because there are no statutory minimum wages and coordination
mechanisms are weak. This subgroup is pretty close to the first one.
c. In Ireland, contrary to the other countries of this group, national-level bargaining is
important, trade union density is higher and wage agreements are of a longer duration.
d. In Denmark, Norway and Sweden, both trade union density and average agreement
length are high, coordination mechanisms are more important and governments have a
limited role.
2. In the second group, the wage bargaining system can be seen as even more regulated because
indexation and government interventions play a more important role. This second group
exhibits the same general wage setting characteristics of the previous group, except that in addition,
indexation, intersectoral agreements and the role of government are all more important. In addition,
trade union densities are generally higher. This group is found to include:
e. Belgium, Cyprus and Luxembourg where wage indexation covers most workers.
f. Spain, Slovenia and Finland where wage indexation operates through minimum wage
or collective agreements.
3. Finally, the last group gathers the countries where the wage bargaining system is largely
deregulated. The US can be considered as a role model here. This group includes countries with
very low trade union densities, low levels of collective agreement coverage, the general absence of24
coordination, decentralised wage bargaining frameworks and a relatively short agreement length of
about one year. This group is found to include:
a. T h e  C z e c h  R e p u b l i c ,  t h e  U K  a n d  t h e  U S :  T h e s e  c o u n t r i e s  f o r m  a  c o r e  g r o u p ,
characterised by decentralised and uncoordinated wage bargaining.
b. Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland: These countries have experienced large
changes in their labour market institutions over the recent decade with generally
decentralized and uncoordinated systems, but still some government involvement
(mainly through tripartite agreements).
c. In Japan, the system is less decentralised compared to the other countries of this
group. The industry-level wage bargaining plays a greater role and the wage
bargaining process is more coordinated.
Figure 8: Dendrogram obtained from the hierarchical cluster analysis
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More generally, the wage setting institutions considered in the 25 countries considered show little
sectoral and time variation in wage setting institutions over the last decade, although there is some
tendency of a greater “feeling” of decentralisation through opt-out clauses and additional firm-level
agreements. Very little change in the average agreement length is apparent over time. These results
suggest that wage bargaining institutions have been rather stable over the last decade and that the
institutional features covered and measured by our questionnaire have been relatively untouched by
labour market reforms.25
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Annex 1:  Questionnaire on national collective wage bargaining and other wage setting
institutions
Initial General Remarks:
x  This  questionnaire  is  addressed  to NCBs7. It aims to collect all information on wage setting
available to each NCB in a harmonised fashion.
x  In  terms  of  the time period to be covered, the target is to have information for 2006 or the most
recently available year and a point of reference in or around 1995.
x  Respondents are kindly requested to supply figures or ranges in the quantitative questions,
underline relevant answers where indicated and provide further explanatory/qualitative
information in the qualitative questions.
x  NO BOX SHOULD BE BLANK! PLEASE DENOTE IR FOR IRRELEVANT OR NK FOR NOT
KNOWN.
THANK YOU!
1.  Trade union density
Please provide trade union membership in your country as a percentage of employees either in numbers or, if
not available, by choosing from the following ranges: Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-
75%> High <76-100%> Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total (NACE
A-P)
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
1995/reference point
(please give date)
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
Do/did extension procedures
exist in your country? (link to
question 2)
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
If yes, are/were they
automatic?
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
Or do/did they alternatively
need to be requested by one
or by all parties?
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
2006 If yes, please provide details.
1995
7 The replies to the questionnaire of the representatives of the 24 national central banks do not necessarily
reflect the opinion of the central banks they are affiliated to.28
2.  Collective bargaining/ trade union coverage
Please provide percentages of employees covered by collective agreements either in numbers or, if not
available, by choosing from the following ranges: Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-75%>
High <76-100%> Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total (NACE
A-P)
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
1995/reference point
(please give date)
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
Does/did coverage differ for
different sizes of firms?
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
2006 If yes, please provide details.
1995
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
2006
Yes / No
Does/did coverage vary
across different types of
workers? e. g. manual/non
manual, skilled/unskilled,
part-time/full-time,
permanent/temporary
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
1995
Yes / No
2006 If yes, please provide details.
1995
3.  Level of wage bargaining
Please indicate with an X in the grid below the level(s) at which wage bargaining takes place in your country.
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
Agriculture etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-
F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
National level
Regional level
Intersectoral level
Sectoral level
Occupational level
Company level
Which one (or more) of the
above levels is (are) the most
dominant?
Please briefly explain the
process through which the
final bargaining outcome is
reached.
Please indicate major parties
involved (e.g. major unions,
major employer
representatives etc.)
Is there a legal possibility for
firms to deviate from higher
level agreements, via for
example so-called opening
clauses?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, how wide is the use of
this practice?29
1995/reference point
(please give date)
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
National level
Regional level
Intersectoral level
Sectoral level
Occupational level
Company level
Which one (or more) of the
above levels was (were) the
most dominant?
Please briefly explain the
process through which the
final bargaining outcome was
reached.
Please indicate major parties
involved (e.g. major unions,
major employer
representatives etc.)
Was there a legal possibility
for firms to deviate from
higher level agreements, via
for example so-called opening
clauses?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, how wide was the use
of this practice?
4. Coordination of wage bargaining
Please indicate with an X in the grid below the level(s) at which wage bargaining coordination takes place in
your country. Please respond for each column in turn.
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
State imposed 1
pay indexation (also see
question 5)
State imposed 2
statutory minimum wage (also
see question 6)
Inter-associational
by national or cross-sectoral
agreements
Intra-associational
within peak employers’ and
trade union organisations
Pattern bargaining
coordination by a sectoral
trend-setter
Other (please specify)
Which one (or more) of the
above levels is (are) the most
dominant?
1995/reference point
(please give date)
Agriculture
etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
State imposed 1
pay indexation (also see
question 5)
State imposed 2
statutory minimum wage (also
see question 6)30
Inter-associational
by national or cross-sectoral
agreements
Intra-associational
within peak employers’ and
trade union organisations
Pattern bargaining
coordination by a sectoral
trend-setter
Other (please specify)
Which one (or more) of the
above levels was (were) the
most dominant?
5. Nature of government involvement /legislation at a national level
Please provide comparative information on government involvement in the wage setting process.
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.
2006/Most recent information
(please give date)
1995/reference point (please give
date)
Is/was the government
involved as an intermediary
between trade union and
employers?
Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, please provide details
on this process.
Is/was the government
involved in tripartite
agreements?
Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, please provide details
on this process.
Is/was the government
involved in the setting of
public sector wages?
Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, please provide details
on this process.31
6. Determinants of/factors entering collective wage negotiations:
Please indicate with an X in the grid below the factor(s) which enter collective wage negotiations in your
country. Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated..
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
Agriculture
etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Prices: please specify price
index used
Labour productivity
please specify if using
average labour productivity of
whole economy, sector,
industry, firm
Competitiveness: please
specify indicator used e.g.
average pay increase in
neighbouring countries, other
(please specify)
Other: please specify
Do changes in taxation or
social contribution rates affect
wage negotiations?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, how?
Please provide if available the
relevant formula used, on the
basis of the above noted
factors.
1995/reference point
(please give date)
Agriculture
etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Prices: please specify price
index used
Labour productivity:
please specify if using
average labour productivity of
whole economy, sector,
industry, firm
Competitiveness: please
specify indicator used
e.g. average pay increase in
neighbouring countries, other
(please specify)
Other: please specify
Did changes in taxation or
social contribution rates affect
wage negotiations?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, how?
Please provide if available the
relevant formula used, on the
basis of the above noted
factors.32
7. Collective bargaining agreement length
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Average length of new
agreements
Is there a specific timetable
for wage negotiations in your
country? e.g. a specific
month(s) within a year
(please specify)
Are re-negotiations before
normal agreement expiry
common?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
Are delays in agreement
renewal common?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
What determines these
irregularities? e.g. cyclical
downturns, other (please
specify)
What kinds of measures are
adopted to deal with them?
e.g. one-off payments, other
(please specify)
With respect to the answers
given above, are there any
differences between different
types of workers? e. g.
manual/non manual,
skilled/unskilled, part-time/full-
time, permanent/temporary
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, please provide details.
1995/reference point
(please give date)
Agriculture
etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Average length of new
agreements
Was there a specific timetable
for wage negotiations in your
country? e.g. a specific
month(s) within a year
(please specify)
Were re-negotiations before
normal agreement expiry
common?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
Were delays in agreement
renewal common?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
What determined these
irregularities? e.g. cyclical
downturns, other (please
specify)
What kinds of measures were
adopted to deal with them?
e.g. one-off payments, other
(please specify)
With respect to the answers
given above, were there any
differences between different
types of workers? e. g.
manual/non manual,
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No33
skilled/unskilled, part-time/full-
time, permanent/temporary
If yes, please provide details.
8. Statutory/national minimum wages
For the questions requiring percentages please provide figures as percentages in numbers or, if not available,
by choosing from the following ranges: Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-75%> High <76-
100%> Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
Agriculture
etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Do minimum wages exist in
your country?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
Where do these stem from?
(please underline the
relevant answer)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
Percentage of employees
paid at the minimum wage
Level of minimum wage in
euros
Ratio of minimum to average
wage
Ratio of minimum to median
wage
Elements affecting the level
of minimum wages:
e.g. sector, region,
manual/non-manual
workers/trainees, years of
experience, age, education,
marital status, disabilities,
other (please list all that
apply)
Does the minimum wage
interact with other systems
of protecting pay at the
bottom of the labour market?
(e.g. training schemes, wage
subsidies)
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, please explain.
Elements affecting the rate
of increase in minimum
wages:
e.g. sector, region,
manual/non-manual
workers/trainees, inflation,
productivity,
fairness/convergence
factors, other (please list all
that apply)
Give formula for the
increase, if relevant, using
the elements considered, as
listed above.
Are increases in minimum
wages binding?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
Are increases in minimum
wages taken as a basis for
other wage increases?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No34
If yes, how?
1995/reference point
(please give date)
Agriculture
etc.
(NACE A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Did minimum wages exist in
your country?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
Where did these stem from?
(please underline the
relevant answer)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
National
legislation
Collective
agreements
Other (please
specify)
Percentage of employees
paid at the minimum wage
Level of minimum wage in
euros
Ratio of minimum to average
wage
Ratio of minimum to median
wage
Elements affecting the level
of minimum wages:
e.g. sector, region,
manual/non-manual
workers/trainees, years of
experience, age, education,
marital status, disabilities,
other (please list all that
apply)
Did the minimum wage
interact with other systems
of protecting pay at the
bottom of the labour market?
(e.g. training schemes, wage
subsidies)
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, please explain.
Elements affecting the rate
of increase in minimum
wages:
e.g. sector, region,
manual/non-manual
workers/trainees, inflation,
productivity,
fairness/convergence
factors, other (please list all
that apply)
Give formula for the
increase, if relevant, using
the elements considered, as
listed above.
Were increases in minimum
wages binding?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
Were increases in minimum
wages taken as a basis for
other wage increases?
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No
If yes, how?
9. Indexation mechanisms (also see/use information/updated information  in Annex 1 to this
questionnaire)
For the questions requiring percentages please provide figures as percentages in numbers or, if not available,
by choosing from the following ranges:
Very Low <0-25%> Low <26-50%> Moderate <51-75%> High <76-100%>
Please respond for each column in turn, underlining Yes or No where indicated.35
2006/Most recent
information (please give
date)
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Percentage of workers
covered by automatic/direct
indexation mechanisms
The information below is intended to largely correspond to the information in Annex 1, but in addition
allow for a sectoral view and a comparison to 1995
Type of indexation
none/automatic/only in
minimum wages/part of
negotiations/combination
(please provide details)
Which price index is used for
reference?
Does indexation refer to its
past, expected or targeted
annual rate of increase?
Average duration of
agreements
If relevant, under what
circumstances does
renegotiation take place?
If there is a retroactive
element to wage indexation in
your country, please provide
details of the relevant process.
1995/reference point (please
give date)
Agriculture
etc. (NACE
A-B)
Industry
(NACE C-F)
Market
Services
(NACE G-K)
Non-Market
Services
(NACE L-P)
Total
(NACE A-P)
Percentage of workers
covered by automatic/direct
indexation mechanisms
The information below is intended to largely correspond to the information in Annex 1, but in addition
allow for a sectoral view and a comparison to 1995
Type of indexation
none/automatic/only in
minimum wages/part of
negotiations/combination
(please provide details)
Which index was used?
Did indexation refer to its past,
expected or targeted annual
rate of increase?
Average duration of
agreements
If relevant, under what
circumstances did
renegotiation take place?
If there was a retroactive
element to wage indexation in
your country, please provide
details of the relevant process.
PLEASE CHECK THAT NO BOXES HAVE BEEN LEFT BLANK
IF NEEDED PLEASE DENOTE IR FOR IRRELEVANT OR NK FOR NOT KNOWN36
Annex 2 – Comparison of questionnaire replies with other data sources
Table 4 Trade union density
Source OECD 94-97 OECD 94-97
WDN
Questionnaire OECD 2004
WDN
Questionnaire
Reference year 1990 1994 1995 2000 2006
Austria 46 42 46 36.5 35
Belgium 51 54 52 55.6 57
Czech Republic - - L 27.0 L
Denmark 71 76 89 74.4 82
Finland 72 81 78 76.2 69
France 10 9 8.2 9.7 VL
Germany 33 29 28.7 25.0 21.7
Greece 34 - L - VL
Hungary - - 19.7 19.9 16.9
Ireland 50 - 27.6 - 45.8
Italy 39 39 L 34.9 L
Japan 25 24 22.7 21.5 18.1
Luxemburg 50 - 51 33.6 48.1
Netherlands 26 26 28.4 23.2 26.8
Norway 56 58 M 54.0 M
Poland - - 33 14.7 15
Portugal 32 32 L 24.3 L
Spain 11 19 VL 14.9 VL
Sweden 83 91 H 81.1 H
United Kingdom 39 34 29 31.2 25.8
United States 16 16 14.9 12.8 12.5
Sources: OECD 94-97: OECD Employment Outlook 1994, p. 184 and 1997, p. 71; OECD 2004:
OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3.
Table 5 Union coverage
Source OECD 1997 W&H (2000) OECD 1997
WDN
Questionnaire W&H 2000 OECD 2004
WDN
Questionnaire
Reference Year 1990 1990 1994 1995 1996 2000* 2006
Austria 98 71 98 95+ - 95 98
Belgium 90 90 90 more than 90 - 90 more than 90
Czech Republic - L - 25 M
Denmark 69 - 69 79 55 80 83
Finland 95 95 95 >90 95 90 >90
France 92 95 95 93.3 90 90 97.8
Germany 90 76 92 59 83 68 72
Greece - H 90 - H
Hungary - 45.1 45 30 38.5
Italy 83 82 H 90 80 H
Japan 23 - 21 20.2 - 15 16.1
Netherlands 71 60 81 81 80 80 81
Norway 75 75 74 M 66 70 M
Poland - M - 40 L
Portugal 79 62 71 H - 80 H
Spain 76 60 78 82.5 82 80 78.5
Sweden 86 83 89 H 85 90 H
United Kingdom 47 65 47 34.5 48 30 33.5
United States 18 - 18 16.7 - 14 13.6
* Lower bound estimates
Sources: OECD 1997: OECD Employment Outlook 1997; W&H (2000): Waddigton and Hoffman
(2000); OECD 2004: OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3.37
Table 6 Extension procedures
Source
Extension Automatic Extension Automatic
Austria N (Y) Y N
Belgium Y N Y N
Denmark N N
Finland Y N Y N
France Y N Y N
Germany Y N Y (specific) N
Greece Y N Y N
Hungary Y N Y N
Ireland Y (rare) Y Y
Italy Y Y Y Y
Netherlands Y N Y N
Norway N N
Poland Y N Y Y
Portugal Y N Y Y
Spain Y Y Y Y
Sweden N N
United Kingdom N N
United States N N
OECD (2004) WDN questionnaire (2006)
Sources: OECD (2004): OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3, Table 3.4 p. 148.
Table 7 Most dominant level of wage bargaining
OECD 2004
WDN
Questionnaire OECD 2004
WDN
Questionnaire
1990-94 1995 1995-2000 2006
Austria I I +Occ I I +Occ
Belgium I I I I
Czech Republic Co Co Co Co
Denmark I Co/I Co/I Co/I
Finland Ce I Ce Ce
France Co/I Co/I Co/I Co/I
Germany I I + Reg I I + Reg
Hungary Co Co Co Co
Ireland I/Ce Ce I/Ce Ce
Italy Co/I I Co/I I
Japan Co I Co I
Netherlands I I I I
Norway I/Ce I I/Ce I
Poland Co Co Co Co
Portugal I/Ce I I/Ce I
Spain I I + Reg I I + Reg
Sweden I I+Occ I I+Occ
United Kingdom Co Co Co Co
United States Co Co Co Co
Legend:  Co : company level ; Co/I : combination of company and industry levels ; I: industry level ;
I/Ce : industry level and regular central-level agreements ; Ce: central-level agreements.
Sources: OECD (2004): OECD Employment Outlook 2004, Chp. 3, Table 3.4 p. 148.38
Annex 3:
Table 8: Trade union density (0%<Very Low<25%, 26%<Low<50%, 51%<Moderate<75%, 76%<High<100%)
Country 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995 2006 vs 1995 2006 1995
Austria VL VL L L VL VL H H L L
Belgium L L M M L L M M M M
Cyprus M M
Czech Republic L L L L
Denmark M H H È M H È H H H
Estonia VL VL VL L VL L
Finland H H Ç L M È H H È M H
France VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Germany (West) L M È VL VL L M È VL L
Germany (East) L L VL VL L L VL L
Greece VL L
Hungary VL VL Ç VL VL È VL VL È L L È VL VL
Ireland L L
Italy H H L L VL VL L L L L
Japan VL VL VL L È VL VL VL VL È VL VL
Lithuania VL VL VL VL VL VL L L VL VL
Luxembourg L M
The Netherlands VL VL È L L È VL VL L M È L L
Norway VL VL M M L L H H M M
Poland VL L È VL L È VL VL L L VL L
Portugal VL VL L L M M L L L L
Slovenia L M È L M È L M È L M È L M
Spain VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Sweden H H H H H H H H H H
The Untited Kingdom VL VL È L VL Ç VL VL Ç M L Ç L L
The United States VL VL VL VL È VL VL È VL VL VL VL
In sum - number of countries
Very low 13 11 8 6 14 13 4 4 11 6
Low 3 2 9 7 4 2 10 7 9 12
Moderate 1 1 2 4 2 3 2 4 4 5
High 2 2 3 3 1 2 5 4 2 3
Total 19 16 22 20 21 20 21 19 26 26
Note: 2006 refers to 2005 in Austria, 2000 in Belgium, 2004 in Germany W and E, 2000 in Denmark and 2001 in Poland
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
Non-Mkt Serv
Note: Arrows refer to position in 2006 relative to 1995, if quantitaive value is provided and difference is at least 1pp. A sign is also filled in if there is a change in category, even without precise figures provided.
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Indu Mkt Serv39
Table 9: Extension procedures: existence
2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria N N N N N N N N N N
Belgium Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Cyprus N N N N N N N N N N
Czech Republic N N  Y Y Y Y N N N N
Denmark N N N N N N N N N N
Estonia Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Finland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
France Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
Germany Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N
Greece Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Hungary Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ireland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Italy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Japan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lithuania N N N N N N N N N N
Luxembourg N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
The Netherlands Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway N N Y N N N N N N N
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slovenia Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sweden N N N N N N N N N N
The Untited Kingdom N
The United States N N Y Y N N N N N N
Yes 14 11 17 15 17 15 13 11 15 13
No 8 11 6 9 7 9 10 12 10 11
Total 22 22 23 24 24 24 23 23 25 24
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv40
Table 10: Extension procedures: Automatic
2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria
Belgium N N N N N N N N N N
Cyprus
Czech Republic N N N N
Denmark
Estonia N N N N N
Finland N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
France N N N N N N N N
Germany N N N N N
Greece N N N N N N N N
Hungary N N N N N N N N N N
Ireland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Italy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Japan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lithuania
Luxembourg N N N N N N
The Netherlands N N N N N N N N N N
Norway N
Poland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slovenia N N N N N
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sweden
The Untited Kingdom
The United States N N
Yes 5 7 5 7 4 7 3 6 4 7
No 8 4 12 8 11 8 8 5 9 6
Total 13 11 17 15 15 15 11 11 13 13
Note: Hungary, 1992
Source: Answers provided by NCB experts to WDN wage questionnaire
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv41
Table 11: Minimum wage: % of employees concerned (0%<Very Low<25%, 26%<Low<50%, 51%<Moderate<75%, 76%<High<100%)
Country 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Belgium < 10
Cyprus 10-15 8-10
Czech Republic VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Estonia 5.7
France 12.5 8.9 20.5 15.7 16.8 14.1
Hungary 8.0 3.9
Ireland 4.5
Japan VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Lithuania 9.6 7.5 11.4 6.4 8.5
Luxemburg 36 8.3 13 10 11.8 11.6
Netherlands 3.8 4.6
Poland VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 4.5 VL
Portugal 10 L 8 L 9 L 5 L 7 L
Slovenia 2 3.3 3.6 0.7 2.7
Spain 1 1 to 2 1 1 to 2 1 1 to 2 1 1 to 2 1 1 to 2
United States 1.5 3.3
Total Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv
A-P A-B C-F G-K L-P42
Table 12: Average agreement length
Country 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Belgium 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Cyprus 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Czech Republic 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1
Denmark 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 2
Estonia 1 1 1 2 2 1.5 1.5 1 1
Finland 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1-2
France 1.5 1.5
Germany 2.2 1.25
Greece 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
Hungary 1 1
Ireland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Italy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Japan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Luxembourg 2 2 2 2 2 2
The Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Poland 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 2 2 2 2 2
Spain 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Sweden 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
The Untited Kingdom 1 1
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv43
Table 13: Common renegotiations before expiration
2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria N N N N N N N N N N
Belgium N N N N N N N N N N
Cyprus N N N N N N N N N N
Czech Republic Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
Denmark N N N N N N N N N N
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland N N N N N N N N N N
France N N N N N N N N N N
Germany Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Greece N N N N N N N N N N
Hungary N N
Ireland N N N N N N N N N N
Italy N N N N N N N N N N
Japan N N N N N N N N N N
Lithuania
Luxembourg Y Y Y Y
The Netherlands Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Norway N N N N N N N N N N
Poland
Portugal N N N N N N N N N N
Slovenia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Spain N N N N N N N N
Sweden Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
The Untited Kingdom N
The United States Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv44
Table 14: Common delays in agreement renewals
2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995 2006 1995
Austria Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Belgium N N N N N N N N N N
Cyprus N N N N N N N N N N
Czech Republic N N N N N N N N N N
Denmark N N N N N N N N N N
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Finland N N N N N N N N N N
France Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Germany Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N
Greece Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y
Hungary
Ireland Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Italy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Japan N N N N N N N N N N
Lithuania
Luxembourg Y Y Y Y
The Netherlands N N N N N N N N N N
Norway N N N N N N N N N N
Poland
Portugal Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slovenia N N N N N N N N N N
Spain Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sweden N N N N N N N N N N
The Untited Kingdom
The United States Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Total
A-B C-F G-K L-P A-P
Agri Ind Mkt Serv Non-Mkt Serv45
Annex 4: Variables included in the hierarchical analysis
1. Trade union density (question 1) (VL, L, M, H (coded 1-4));
2. Extension procedures (question 1) (none, requested, automatic (coded 1-3))
3. Coverage of collective agreements (question 2) (VL, L, M, H (coded 1-4))
4.  Most dominant level of wage bargaining (question 3) (national, regional, sectoral, company (coded
1-4))
5. Level of wage bargaining – company, occupational, sectoral, intersectoral, regional, national (all
question 3) (all coded 0-1)
6. Existence of opening clauses (question 3) (coded 0-1)
7. Coordination - pay indexation, inter-associational, intra-associational, statutory minimum wage,
pattern bargaining (all question 4) (all coded 0-1)
8. Government involvement (question 5) (none, public sector wages, intermediary, tripartite
agreements (coded 0-3))
9. Average length of wage agreements (question 7) (coded 1-3)
10. Minimum wage (question 8) (none, collective agreements, statutory (coded 1-3))
11. % of workers covered by indexation mechanisms (question 9) (0, VL, L, M, H (coded 0-4))
12. Type of indexation (question 9) (none, minimum wage, collective agreements, automatic (coded 1-
4)). 
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